behaviour of markets under stress since it featured the default of Russia in mid-August, the near-bankruptcy of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) the following month and other episodes of stress.
The contributions to price discovery of trading in spot and futures markets are measured by the information shares of Hasbrouck (1995) and factor weights obtained from a GonzaloGranger decomposition. Both methods are based on a vector error correction model (VECM) and allow the separation of long-run price movements based on information from short-run microstructure noise. Since there are by an order of magnitude more transactions in the futures market than in the underlying bonds, the VECM is rewritten in state space form to handle missing observations with the Kalman filter. In a second step, the robustness of the estimates is checked using a sequence of break tests.
The results show that a number of structural breaks in the pricing relationship between the spot and futures markets occurred during 1998. In particular, the information share of the spot market dropped from between 19% and 33% of the variation in the efficient price in the first half of the year to virtually zero during the two weeks after the LTCM recapitalisation on 23 September. By contrast, the informational content of spot trading had hardly changed in the aftermath of the Russian default five weeks earlier, even though the tests indicate a break in the parameters of the VECM. The information content of bond trades appears to be linked to large client trades that do not affect dealer inventory. Such transactions tend to have a larger price impact than trades in which dealers enter as counterparties, which is consistent with them being more likely to be motivated by information. Approximately 40% of all large trades fell into this category in the first, tranquil part of the year. This number changed only slightly following Russia's default in mid-August 1998, but dropped to less than one third in late September and early October when the information share of the spot market dropped to zero.
Price discovery in bonds and bond futures is also analysed by Mizrach and Neely (2005) for the United States and Campbell and Hendry (2006) for Canada. Mizrach and Neely find that US Treasury notes and bonds dominated price discovery until 1999, after which both the Gonzalo-Granger factor weight and the information share of spot trading dropped below one half. Campbell and Hendry report that bonds accounted for approximately 30% of price discovery in the Canadian market in the early 2000s. 5 This paper differs from these studies by explicitly testing whether the pricing relationships found under normal market conditions continue to hold in periods of stress. This is important because the 1998 turbulences saw the breakdown of several pricing relationships that market participants had taken as given, leading to substantial losses at many market participants, most prominently LTCM. Previous work on price discovery under stress has focused on single market segments only and has ignored any linkages between markets. For example, Upper (2001) studies liquidity in the German government bond market during 1998, whereas Remolona (2002) and analyse price discovery in the US Treasury market during the same period. While a good understanding of a single, large market is clearly important, these studies do not give much indication as to how stress affects the pricing relationships 5 Most other studies comparing the contributions to price discovery of futures and cash instruments (or different types of futures) focus on the pricing relationship between individual US stocks and stock index futures (for references see Hasbrouck (2003) ). They generally find the futures market dominant in terms of price discovery, although there are also measurable effects in the reverse direction. However, it is not clear to what extent these findings can be transferred to bonds and bond futures, which refer to a single bond chosen from a basket of deliverables rather than to an index (see Subrahmanyam (1991) ). A related literature focuses on the lead-lag relationships between futures and spot markets. For example, Scalia (1998) finds that futures prices lead Italian bond prices by up to 20 minutes, although the lead weakens on days with a lot of "bad news". Another strand of the literature (eg Hasbrouck (2003) , Kurov and Lasser (2004) , Ates and Wang (2005) , Chou and Chung (2006) ) studies the contributions to price discovery of conventional, pit-traded futures contracts, electronically traded E-minis and exchange-traded funds (ETFs). To the extent that the choice between futures and bonds is also affected by differences in the microstructures of the two markets and not only by different instrument characteristics, the present paper is also related to a large body of literature that studies the impact of trading mechanisms on price discovery. We will turn to some papers in this vein when discussing the effect of market microstructure on informed investors' choice of where to trade. between markets, which could have important implications for the usefulness of hedging strategies. 6 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes differences in instrument characteristics and market microstructure that may affect the decision of informed investors as to where to trade. Section 2 discusses the data and section 3 the econometric methodology used to compute the contributions to price discovery. The estimation results are presented in section 4 and are related to information on the composition of trades in section 5.
A final section concludes.
Market microstructure and the choice of where to trade
Why would informed market participants prefer to trade in bonds rather than futures?
7 The higher liquidity of the futures does not provide an ultimate reason for the choice of trading, since liquidity is largely endogenous. Instead, the decision must be related either to the nature of the instruments or to the microstructure of the two markets.
The key characteristics which distinguish a futures contract from the underlying security are summarised in table 1. Perhaps the most important differences between these two types of contracts are the amount of cash required to attain a given exposure and the timing of the cash injections. Cash requirements for trading in the futures market are much lower than those for 6 See CGFS (1999) for an overview of the 1998 turbulences. For a more conceptual approach to the provision of liquidity under stress and the lessons learned from 1998, see Borio (2004) .
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In fixed-income markets, informed traders are those with a superior ability of forecasting interest rate developments or with inside knowledge of the order flow. Another advantage of futures over bonds is that they can easily be used to take short positions.
Shorting a bond is more difficult since traders first have to enter a repo transaction to borrow the bond they wish to sell. As a consequence, we would expect both the hedging of and position-taking in long-term interest rate risk to occur in the futures market, which should drive up its information share. This is in line with evidence from Naik and Yadav (2003) that dealers in UK government bonds hedge almost entirely by trading in futures rather than in bonds.
In 1998, the year of the sample, the microstructure of the futures market for German government bonds was very different from that of the spot market, although the differences have narrowed since then. First of all, bond trading was much more dispersed than futures trading, both in terms of the number of contracts active at any given point in time and in terms of trading venues. While trading in Bund futures was concentrated on Eurex, 8 bonds were mainly traded over the counter, either by telephone or through inter-dealer brokers. In addition, they were listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and on regional exchanges, but those transactions were generally small and their share in total turnover low. 9 In addition, while trading in the futures market was concentrated on the nearby maturity, existing bonds continued to be traded after a new one was issued. Moreover, the most recent issue was generally more liquid than the cheapest-to-deliver. The fragmentation of the spot market should matter in particular under volatile market conditions, when the costs of searching for a counterparty are high. However, while this should reduce the attractiveness of bonds for informed investors, it may not eliminate it completely if there are liquidity traders who, for whatever reason, cannot switch to another market. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) argue that informed traders may use such transactions to "hide" their trades.
8
A virtually identical contract was traded on LIFFE, but had lost most of its market share by the second quarter of 1998.
9
More recently, the spot market for German government bonds has been transformed, first by the advent of the electronic trading system EuroMTS in early 1999. However, it was not until the inclusion of bonds in the Eurex trading platform in late 2000 that it became possible to trade futures and bonds simultaneously on a unified trading platform, thus eliminating the risks arising from non-synchronous trading. While these developments may have reduced the dispersion of bond trading across trading venues (although multiple platforms continue to exist), they have not reduced the fragmentation of liquidity across the different bonds.
A second difference concerns the matching of counterparties. In the futures market, the electronic limit order book of Eurex ensures the immediate execution of trades at predictable costs, whereas trading in the spot market may involve search costs and the risk of price movements. In fast markets, however, it may not be attractive for traders to place limit orders as prices may move against them, which would suggest a higher contribution to price discovery of the spot market. This reasoning has been confirmed in previous work comparing electronic trading of Bund futures on the DTB (the predecessor of Eurex) and floor trading on LIFFE. For example, Martens (1998) shows that trading on the DTB contributed more to price discovery than trading on LIFFE when volatility was low, but the ordering was reversed in fact markets. Similarly, Frino, McInish and Toner (1998) find that bid-ask spreads on the DTB were below those at LIFFE except when volatility was high. However, it is not clear to what extent comparisons between floor and electronic trading translate to the case of electronic trading and decentralised OTC markets, where search costs are higher than on the floor of an exchange.
The third factor related to differences in market microstructure that may affect the location of informed trading is the precise nature of transparency. While the limit order book of Eurex is open to all market participants and information on price and volume of past transactions is disseminated in real time, this was not the case in the spot market during our period of analysis. Even so, one cannot say that the futures market was more transparent than the spot market, where dealers could observe the identity of their immediate counterpart. The electronic limit order book of Eurex, by contrast, is fully anonymous. In this regard, the bond market was similar to the "upstairs" markets which are an important feature of many stock markets. 10 Two hypotheses have been put forward to explain the existence of upstairs markets alongside organised trading, be it on the floor or electronically. First, the lack of anonymity of upstairs markets, together with the ability to negotiate the precise terms of a deal, may render them attractive for large transactions, provided clients can convince dealers that their trades are not motivated by information. This is akin to the function of upstairs markets in the model of Seppi (1990) .
Another factor explaining the attractiveness of upstairs trading stems from the observation that it is costly for investors to participate continuously in all markets or submit limit orders that are contingent on every state of the economy (Grossman (1992) ). Upstairs brokers solve this problem by matching orders with the unexpressed demand (i.e. possible wishes to trade that have not been expressed in limit orders) of other market participants, facilitating trades that would otherwise not have occurred (Madhavan and Cheng (1997) , Bessembinder and Venkatamaran (2004)). This matching function of upstairs markets is independent of whether or not trades are motivated by information. Indeed, one may even argue that the upstairs markets are particularly attractive for informed investors owing to their flexibility in handling non-standard order types or hiding potential liquidity. 11, 12 The empirical literature is inconclusive on whether informed traders prefer anonymity. While the results of Grammig, Schiereck and Theissen (2001) suggest that they do, Reiss and Werner (2005) find that, in the London inter-dealer market, informed dealers tend to trade directly, i.e. without the added fully anonymous as with Eurex. Another difference is that, unlike the Bund market, upstairs markets tend to have certain requirements regarding the publication of past trades.
anonymity of an inter-dealer broker, because prices in anonymous markets reflect the risk of asymmetric information.
To sum up, instrument characteristics and market microstructure should make futures more attractive than bonds for informed traders, which should result in a larger contribution to price discovery of that market. However, futures may lose some of their edge when volatility is high, as margin calls drive up cash requirements and placing limit orders becomes more risky.
We would therefore expect the information role of the spot market to increase in times of stress.
Contract details and data
The Bund future refers to a notional German government bond with a face value of DM 250,000 13 and a coupon of 6%. At expiry of the contract, the seller of the future can choose to deliver any German government bond (Bundesanleihe) with a residual maturity of 8½ to 10½ years at a predetermined price. The bonds are converted into the notional bond by multiplying the face value with a conversion factor that accounts for differing coupons and maturities. Since this adjustment is not perfect, it may be cheaper to fulfil the obligations arising from a futures position by delivering one rather than another issue. Consequently, only one of the bonds contained in the basket, the so-called cheapest-to-deliver (ctd), tends to be delivered.
The data used in this paper covers all transactions in the Bund future and the cheapest-todeliver bonds that took place in Germany between 2 January and 7 December 1998. Although the ctd bond was not the most actively traded deliverable bond during the period (see Upper (2001) for activity and liquidity measures of all deliverable bonds in 1998), trading strategies that link futures and spot markets tend to focus on this issue rather than the more liquid onthe-run bond.
Prices and trading volumes of the Bund future are from Deutsche Börse AG and cover the contracts with the expiry dates March, June, September and December 1998. While this data is generally of high quality, it does not contain any information on the counterparts of the individual trades. A second data set from the German regulator (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht -BaFin) covers both the Bund future and the underlying bonds.
In contrast to the data by Deutsche Börse, it also includes OTC transactions. This is particularly important for the bond market, where trades typically take place outside organised exchanges. In addition to providing information on prices and volumes, the reporting dealers have to state whether (i) they traded on their own account or for a client, and (ii) whether the transaction affected their own position in the respective asset. This information will later be used to distinguish between informed trading and transactions motivated by liquidity needs.
One drawback of the BaFin data is that it contains separate entries for the two legs of each transaction. Unfortunately, matching the data proves to be very difficult, 14 which reduces the reliability of the series concerning the number and volume of trades. By contrast, matching problems should not have much of an impact on the series for prices and trade sizes.
Neither data set contains information on trades executed outside Germany. In particular, they do not cover trading in Bund futures on LIFFE, which in the first quarter of 1998 accounted for approximately one third of all trading in this type of contract. However, trading on LIFFE quickly faded in the second quarter of 1998 and was discontinued towards the end of the year, implying that the presence of the London-traded contract should not have any bearing on our results for most of the year. Ignoring offshore trading in the underlying bonds may potentially be more serious, but discussions with market participants suggested that, just as in the futures market, a considerable proportion of the bond trading that used to take place outside Germany had migrated back by 1998. Anyway, significant London trading would only be an issue if the London and Frankfurt markets were not fully integrated.
The analysis is based on transaction prices rather than quotes. This is important in the case of the spot market as quotes were not binding and, according to market contacts, most trading took place at prices inside the bid-ask bracket. Using traded prices does, however, introduce a certain amount of noise due to the bid-ask bounce. Nevertheless, this should not affect the permanent component on which the measures for price discovery are based.
Given the staggered nature of the Bund future, we create a long time series by considering only the contract that was most actively traded on a given trading day. Since trading is concentrated in the nearby maturity and switches to a new contract within a few days, our spliced series contains more than 95% of all transactions. A similar series is constructed for the underlying bond. The difficulty here is predicting which bond is cheapest-to-deliver at the maturity of the future. Fortunately, as long as market interest rates remain below 6%, the formula used to compute the conversion factors implies that this will be the bond with the lowest duration in the basket. Since 10-year yields stood at around 4% in 1998, the probability of a switch in the cheapest-to-deliver was virtually zero. In order to ensure comparability with the future, bond prices are converted into future-equivalents. For this purpose, we require repo rates with maturities coinciding with the expiry dates of the future contracts, which could not be obtained. Instead, we use the two-month FIBOR to calculate the cost of carry. This should not have any consequences for our results concerning the transmission of information in the very short term, since the spread between the two rates tends to move relatively slowly. Finally, the futures market was far more liquid than the bond market, as is indicated by the far lower effective bid-ask spreads. This difference appears to be too large to be solely explained by differences in trade sizes.
Methodology
Under the assumption that no arbitrage opportunities exist, the theoretical price p* f of a futures contract corresponds to the price p s of the underlying plus a cost of carry c:
In the case of bond futures, c can be decomposed into the interest earned on the bond and the cost of financing the bond position, typically through a repo transaction. Since c can readily be computed and is outside our focus of analysis, it is more convenient to work with adjusted spot prices futures and repo markets simultaneously. Second, holding a position may be subject to capital requirements or margin calls even if it is fully hedged. Third, the holder of a short position in bonds and a long position in the future risks ending up with the "wrong" bond if the cheapestto-deliver changes. All these factors imply that we should not expect equation (1) to hold strictly at any point in time. Instead, it can be seen as an attractor, to which prices should return after temporary deviations.
In empirical work, it has proved convenient to model the process driving the prices in the futures and spot markets as a vector error correction model (VECM)
where ( )
. From equation (1) it follows that the adjusted spot and futures prices should be cointegrated with a cointegrating vector (1,-1)', which is imposed by assumption.
As a consequence, the matrix Π has rank one and can be written as
where α 1 and α 2 are the adjustment coefficients or loading factors.
The VECM (2) forms the basis of two competing methodologies to measure the relative contributions of the two markets to price discovery: the information shares introduced by Hasbrouck (1995) and the factor loadings based on the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) decomposition. 15 Both are based on a decomposition of transaction prices into a permanent component associated with the fundamental or efficient price of the asset, and a transitory component which reflects noise such as the bid-ask bounce. In the case considered here, the fundamental or efficient price should be identical in both markets while the transitory component may differ. The question is in which market information is first incorporated into the efficient price.
The two methodologies differ in terms of how the permanent component is identified. (ii) that the transitory component does not Granger-cause the permanent component in the long run. One drawback of the GG approach is that the permanent component need not be a random walk and may therefore be forecastable. As pointed out by Hasbrouck (2002) , this violates the condition that the efficient price should be a Martingale. A second limitation, 15 A special issue of the Journal of Financial Markets has been devoted to an assessment of the relative merits pointed out by Baillie et al (2002) , is that the GG factor weights, in contrast to the information shares approach, do not take into account the information contained in the variances of the price innovations.
Transactions in financial markets take place at irregular intervals that differ between market segments. The usual approach to handling this is to split the time axis into subperiods of a fixed length and only consider the last transaction in every interval. If an interval is empty, then the last available value is used. This "fill-in" approach has a major drawback: nontrading may produce a lower information share for the less frequent trading market even if the trades that take place do contain information. To circumvent this problem we use a state space method to handle the missing value problem.
The VECM (2) can be written in a state space form with a state equation Since the state vector is only partially observable because of the missing values, the likelihood is computed using the Kalman filter. 16 As starting values, we use OLS estimates from an auxiliary data set containing the price of the last available transaction.
To assess potential time variation in the information share measures, we test for structural changes using a method proposed by Bai (1997) , which is based on a sequence of tests for unknown break points. The classification of different time periods gives almost the same information as time-varying parameters.
The test is based on a parametric model with parameter vector β, the null hypothesis
and an alternative with change point π ∈ (0,1)
is greater than the critical value computed by Andrews (1993) . In principle, Wald, Likelihood Ratio or Lagrange Multiplier could be used, but in our case only the latter is feasible in terms of computing time as it is based on the parameters estimated under the null hypothesis.
Contributions to price discovery
The VECM (2) is estimated with three lags. While computational difficulties prevented the use of formal information criteria, coefficients on fourth-order lags were not significant, and the fact that their inclusion substantially slowed the rate of convergence suggests that three lags are appropriate.
The results for the test for parameter stability are collected in table 3. The test statistic peaks on 4 June (observation 105), suggesting that this is the most likely break point. The VECM is reestimated for the two periods before and after this date, and the tests are repeated for each of the two subsamples. While the estimates appear to be stable in the period up to 4 June, there is evidence for a break in the latter part of the year, with 20 July as the most likely break point.
This procedure is repeated until all the subsamples are stable. As a robustness check, adjacent intervals are combined and the most likely break dates are reestimated, which yields the same dates.
It is interesting to note that two of the subperiods identified by the break tests, namely the one ** Estimates are not reliable because we could not achieve strong convergence for the maximumlikelihood estimation due to the short sample.
17%. The point estimates thus suggest that price discovery took place mainly in the futures market, albeit with a non-negligible contribution of the underlying bond. This is in line with the priors derived from the theoretical and empirical literature surveyed in section 1. The point estimates are very close to those of Campbell and Hendry (2006) for Canada, where the bond market contributed approximately 30% to the variation in the efficient price. They are also not too different from those by Booth et al (2002) , who find that the upstairs market for US stocks contributed less to price discovery than the floor. That said, the relatively wide confidence intervals (obtained using a bootstrap procedure explained in the Appendix) do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of equal information shares. By contrast, the GG factor weight of the bond market is clearly below one half.
The results for the second half of the year vary considerably between the individual phases.
The information content of bond trading was considerably lower during June, much of July and the first half of August than during the first part of the year, although the estimates are not very precise.
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It is interesting to compare the information shares and factor weights during the turbulence in the international financial markets in the wake of Russia's devaluation and default on 17 August to those of the period following the LTCM recapitalisation five weeks later. Both episodes were characterised by a similar level of volatility and turnover, but differed considerably in the respective contributions to price discovery of the two market segments. In the five weeks following the Russian default, the relative contributions of price discovery remained roughly comparable to the tranquil first five months of the year, while daily trading volume (shown in table 5) more than doubled. The stability of the information share during this episode is not in line with our priors, which pointed towards an increase in the information share of the spot market in episodes of high volatility. However, this may be related to the limited precision of the estimates, as indicated by the wide confidence banks.
This qualifier does not apply to our next finding, namely that the information share of the bond dropped to essentially zero in the aftermath of the LTCM recapitalisation on 18 The subperiod 21 July to 31 July is omitted because of econometric problems associated with the low number of observations. 23 September, although neither volatility nor trading volumes changed much compared to the previous five weeks. The confidence intervals for this period are very narrow, and it is easy to reject the hypothesis that the information shares in both markets were equal. The point estimate for the GG factor share is even negative, as the coefficients on the error correction term have the same sign in both equations of the VECM. 19 This suggests that only the price of the bond adjusted towards the equilibrium, while the futures price moved away from it. This does not mean that equilibrium will not be restored eventually, but it suggests that all adjustment takes place in the bond market.
The LTCM episode lasted until 8 October. Afterwards, the information content of the spot market gradually increased and after mid-November reached values similar to those during the reference period during the first, tranquil half of the year.
Composition of trades
The finding that the contributions to price discovery of the spot market remained steady after Russia defaulted on its debt in August 1998 but dropped in the wake of the LTCM recapitalisation, despite a similarly high level of volatility in both periods, suggests that one cannot make broad statements about price discovery based solely on volatility. Instead, one has to look further to identify why such shifts in informed trading occurred. This section presents an attempt in this direction. It analyses data on the composition of trades that may shed some more light on the types of orders that contain information and thus contribute to price discovery in the spot market. The analysis is based on the discussion in section 2, where we argued that the bond market shows parallels to an upstairs market where large orders are executed.
As mentioned before, the BaFin data allows us to distinguish between three types of transactions: The results are consistent with the hypothesis that client trades affecting dealer inventory are less likely to be motivated by information than agency trades, although the evidence is not particularly strong. While the dummy for potentially informed trading is not significant for sales in any size category, there is weak statistical evidence, at the 10% level, that medium to large volume bond purchases that do not affect dealer inventory have a greater positive impact on futures prices than those in which dealers take a position. It takes seven to 10 minutes for the futures market to react to spot trades, and the impact evaporates after 12 to 14 minutes. Table 6 shows data on the types of trades during the base period (2 January to 4 June), the five weeks after the Russian default (21 August to 23 September) and the LTCM episode (24 September to 8 October). 22 Activity in each of the two market segments was much higher during the two episodes of stress than during the first five months of the year, in terms of both the number of transactions and trading volume. Although turnover was fairly similar across the two turbulent periods, there are important differences in the composition and size of client trades. The Russian episode was characterised by much larger client trades, with an average of 34.6 million relative to the 25.3 million during the first half of the year. This could be 21 We consider the effect on futures prices because activity is much higher in this market segment. An alternative would be to measure the impact on the efficient price, which would force us to use a five-minute rather than a one-minute frequency. related to the substantial inflows of capital into the German government bond market during that period, which were reversed in later months (Deutsche Bundesbank (2000) ). These flows involved mainly German investors repatriating their funds from abroad rather than inflows of genuine foreign capital. This may explain why a larger proportion of trades than normal were perceived as being informed. Despite this increase in trade size, the proportion of client trades affecting dealer inventories, i.e. uninformed trades according to our hypothesis, remained roughly in line with that of the tranquil reference period. After the LTCM bailout, the average size of client trades reverted to normal, but an unusually large proportion of these trades appeared to be uninformed. These two observations are in line with the previous finding that the contribution to price discovery of the spot market appeared to be unaffected by the turbulences after the Russian default, but collapsed after 24 September.
Conclusions
Under normal market conditions, the information share of the Bund future is considerably higher than that of the underlying bonds. This does not mean, however, that the spot market does not process any information at all, as it still contributes 19% to 33% of the variation in the efficient price. In times of stress, the informational role of the spot market may break down. For example, the information share of the bond market declined to zero during the two weeks following the recapitalisation of LTCM on 24 September, although it had remained stable after Russia defaulted on its debt five weeks before. Both episodes were characterised by high volatility and an average number of transactions per trading day almost twice as high as during the reference period in the first part of the year. One difference between these two episodes that could explain why the information share of the bond market collapsed after the LTCM capitalisation but not after the Russian default is the lower share of client transactions during the former, in particular those affecting dealer inventory, which were more likely to be motivated by information.
In the absence of more detailed data on the identity of individual market participants, one can only guess who these informed traders were and why their importance fluctuates over time.
Balance of payments data reported in Deutsche Bundesbank (2000) suggests that they were mainly German, but the available data precludes any further breakdown.
The microstructure of the market for German government bonds has changed considerably since 1998, mainly due to the advent of electronic trading. Of course, this is likely to have implications for price discovery, although it is not clear whether electronic trading by itself is sufficient to tip the balance of price discovery from the futures to the spot market. It would be interesting to repeat the exercise of this paper with a more recent dataset that includes transactions on electronic trading platforms. In the absence of bond market turbulences such as that which occurred in 1998, it is not possible, though, to test whether these pricing relationships also hold in periods of stress.
Appendix: Confidence intervals for the information share measures
The information share measures are a non-linear function of the underlying parameters.
Confidence intervals for the information shares are constructed using a parametric bootstrap method. Given the asymptotic multivariate normal distribution of the VECM parameters, we draw from this distribution to generate the distribution for each information share measure and use the simulated distribution to construct the corresponding confidence intervals. In our case, the simulations are based on 10,000 draws. The computational steps are the following:
1.
For the point estimate of the VECM parameters, we compute the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter vector.
2.
We draw from a multivariate normal distribution with mean equal to the point estimate of the parameter vector and covariance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of the point estimate.
3. Using the random parameter vector, we compute the information share measures.
Steps 2 and 3 are repeated 10,000 times and the resulting distribution of the information share measures is then used to compute the confidence intervals. 
